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Abstract—Security patterns are well-known solutions to
security-specific problems. They are often claimed to benefit
designers without much security expertise. We have performed
an empirical study to investigate whether the usage of security
patterns by such an audience leads to a more secure design,
or to an increased productivity of the designers. Our study
involved 32 teams of master students enrolled in a course on
software architecture, working on the design of a realistically-
sized banking system. Irrespective of whether the teams were
using security patterns, we have not been able to detect a
difference between the two treatment groups. However, the teams
prefer to work with the support of security patterns.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security patterns have been a popular research topic for
the past 15 years. Like all patterns, they are expected to be
general, time-tested solutions, which are distilled from real
world examples and solving recurring problems. In particular,
this work focusses on design-level security patterns, which
have a granularity similar to, for instance, design patterns
and architectural styles. Using security patterns for the design
of secure software can provide value in several ways. Most
importantly, the use of security patterns should result in a
‘more secure’ design, i.e., software systems designed with the
support of security patterns should expose fewer security flaws
at the design level. The objective of this work is to test this
hypothesis by means of an empirical study. As an additional
benefit, irrespective of possible security improvements, it
seems plausible that using security patterns could increase
the productivity of designers, as less time would be spent in
brainstorming ad-hoc security solutions. This work analyzes
this possibility as well.
Contribution. In summary, this paper presents a study an-
swering the following two research questions:
RQ1 What is the effect of using security patterns on the
security of a software design?
RQ2 What is the effect of using security patterns on the
productivity of the designer?
To answer these questions, we have performed a controlled
experiment with 32 teams of master students. The teams have
performed 6 design tasks on a realistically-sized system in
the context of a course on software architecture. As far as
the target audience of security patterns is concerned, security
patterns are often claimed to provide particular value to soft-
ware developers with limited security expertise. For example, a
popular book on security patterns states that “security patterns
can be used when the people responsible for enterprises or
systems have little or no security expertise” [1]. Similarly,
a more recent book also claims that “the most common use
for security patterns is to help application developers who are
not security experts to add security in their designs” [2]. The
participants of our study are not security experts, although
some of them have a more security-oriented background due
to their studies. Hence, they provide a very suitable sample
for validating the above claims.
Approach. We have asked the teams to implement some
security requirements in the design of a banking system. We
have compared the resulting designs for differences between
design tasks executed with and without the support of security
patterns. From a methodological perspective, answering the
first research question requires that we can assess the security
of a software design in a quantitative way, in order to enable
statistical comparison. To define such a measure in practice,
we start from the consideration that security-relevant design
flaws lead to security threats, which potential attackers might
pose in order to exploit the flawed system. Therefore, the
number of threats afflicting a given design can be seen as
an effective measure of its (in)security, provided that all
threats have a comparable risk value. For this reason, we have
compiled a set of threats for each design task. These threats
expose design-level weaknesses and, hence, a ‘more secure’
design should be able to counter more (if not all) of them.
Results. To our surprise, irrespective of whether the teams
were using security patterns, we have not been able to detect a
difference across the two treatment groups. Actually, we have
observed that both groups created similar solutions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next
section, we discuss other work that is related to ours. Sec-
tion III provides more details on the design of our study itself,
including the precise hypotheses and measurements, followed
by a description of the execution of the study in Section IV.
The obtained data and our interpretation are presented in
Section V. Section VI elaborates on the design approaches
taken by the teams and the perception of the participants with
respect to security patterns. Section VII lists the threats to
validity, and our conclusion follows in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
Security patterns have been a popular topic for more than
fifteen years. In this period, many patterns have been published
and subsequently surveyed [3], [4], and multiple books about
them have appeared [1], [2], [5].
Despite this popularity, empirical studies on security pat-
terns are lacking. We have started to perform such studies by
empirically evaluating the effect of organizing a catalog of
security patterns [6]. We have found that, counter-intuitively,
a richer organization does not reduce the time that is needed
by a software designer to find a suitable pattern in the catalog.
In this paper, we continue along this track, albeit now with
the goal of empirically confirming or refuting some alleged
benefits of the security patterns themselves. While, to the
best of our knowledge, no such studies have been performed
before for security patterns, a sizeable body of research exists
that considers the effect of well-known design patterns (like
those in the ‘Gang of Four’ book [7]) on software design. We
highlight a couple of these studies in the next paragraphs.
Most related to this paper are approaches that investigate
the effect of design patterns on the number of defects in the
software. An example hereof is the study performed by Vokac
[8], who looked into the code of a large industrial product in
order to verify whether using some well-known design patterns
(e.g., observer, singleton, or factory) leads to fewer design
defects. The author concludes that the usage of design patterns
by itself does not necessarily lead to fewer defects, and the
success depends on the context in which the patterns are used.
Besides the number of defects, patterns may also influence
other dimensions of software development, such as compre-
hensibility and maintainability. One example of research along
this line comes from Jeanmart et al. [9], who have assessed
the impact of the visitor pattern on program comprehension
and maintenance by means of eye tracking. They found that,
while the visitor pattern does not reduce the comprehension
effort, it helps when modification tasks need to be carried out.
To bundle the existing knowledge, Zhang and Budgen [10]
have performed a systematic literature review that summarizes
the available studies concerning the effectiveness of software
design patterns. From 11 studies, they conclude that the results
are not univocal, and there is in general little to no support for
the claims about design patterns. From a software designer per-
spective, the same authors also surveyed experienced design
pattern users [11], and observed that very few of the well-
known design patterns were actually regarded as valuable by
these users.
We conclude with the remark that security patterns are
not the only technique to design secure software. Other
approaches have been published (for example, UMLsec [12]
and SecureUML [13]) and surveyed [14], [15].
III. STUDY DESIGN
All lab material related to this study, including the descrip-
tion of the application and the tasks, the tool that was used, as
well as the (anonymized) data obtained from the participants,
is available online [16].
A. Participants
The participants of the study are 64 students of a master
course on software architecture taught by the authors at KU
TABLE I
QUESTIONNAIRE ABOUT THE TRAINING ON SECURITY ASPECTS.
POSSIBLE ANSWERS WERE: STRONGLY DISAGREE (SD), DISAGREE (D),
AGREE (A), STRONGLY AGREE (SA).
The training was sufficient to
become familiar with...
SD D A SA
security requirements 0 13 18 1
attacks 0 9 21 2
secure design 2 16 14 0
Leuven. The students are divided into 32 teams of 2 members
each1. The participants are free to choose a teammate to work
with, which is standard practice for group projects at our
department.
The participants follow different specialization trajectories
within their master program, like software security, software
engineering, or artificial intelligence. Most teams (26) are
composed of students with different specializations. There
are 7 teams where at least one member follows the security
specialization.
With an anonymous survey conducted before the start of the
study, we have collected additional background information
from the individual participants. In this survey, about 60% of
the participants consider themselves as skilled programmers
with adequate background in software engineering. As UML
is used as the primary language for all models in this study, we
asked the participants to rate their familiarity with this model-
ing language: 63% of the participants rated their familiarity as
either adequate or expert, 32% as limited, and 5% as beginner.
Concerning their security expertise, about 20% of the par-
ticipants have rated their knowledge of security as adequate,
32% as limited, and 48% as beginner. As shown in Table I,
this is corroborated by their responses to three questions
regarding the security-oriented training they have received
at the start of the study (see Section IV-A). Roughly one
half of the teams found the training to be sufficient. Hence,
the study mainly involves participants with a limited security
background, which is the target audience we are interested in.
Finally, almost 60% of the participants have indicated that
they have a working experience in software development. The
majority of the participants has worked in a commercial soft-
ware development context, i.e., the participants’ background
is not purely academic.
Informed consent. All students are aware of the experiment
from the beginning, albeit not of the hypotheses that are
tested. Throughout the entire study, the participants have the
opportunity to opt out of the study. In this case, all additional
information gathered by the experimenters is destroyed. Opt-
ing out does not influence the amount of work that needs to
be done. All students have to carry out the tasks defined in
the study, as they have a pedagogical value and are meant to
1These numbers do not include participants that opted out of the study
(1 team), or that were removed because they did not complete the assignment
according to the scheduled deadlines (4 teams).
give the students a hands-on experience of the secure design
challenges.
Incentives. There are no special incentives for the partici-
pation in the study. The students receive a grade based on a
written report, which summarizes their solutions to the design
tasks. The grade contributes to 20% of their final mark in the
course, irrespective of having opted out.
B. Application
The study is performed with the architecture of a fictitious
bank as object. Throughout the entire course and prior to
entering this study, the students had to develop a project
using the banking system. Therefore, the banking domain is
well-known to the participants by the time this study starts.
Most importantly, the banking application offers sufficient
architectural complexity to be non-trivial. Functionality-wise,
the architecture of the banking application supports a customer
to perform monetary transactions via a bank clerk, the web,
or a mobile app. Also, the banking system needs to interact
with other banks for executing wire transfers, and allow for
real-time debit card payment processing.
The architecture is modeled using UML and documented
in a 32-page PDF file. The documentation includes a context
diagram, a main component-and-connector diagram, decom-
positions of the most important components, a deployment
diagram, and documentation of the interfaces. The complete
document can be found online [16].
C. Catalog of security patterns
For the study, we rely on a catalog of 36 security patterns.
The catalog has been successfully used in the course for
several years already and, in the past, it proved to contain a
sufficiently large set of solutions for the participants to tackle
their design needs. The description of each pattern in the
catalog includes a brief summary, possible aliases, a problem
description, a list of forces, an example, the solution (both
structural and behavioral), implementation guidelines, a list of
consequences and pitfalls, and known uses. The catalog can
be found online [16].
D. Tasks
In order to reduce variability and to make results compa-
rable, the participants are provided with an initial design of
the banking system, as described earlier in section III-B. The
design does not contain any specific security measure. The
participants work in teams and have to extend and harden the
design by means of seven tasks, which are labeled A through
G. A summary of the tasks is given in Table II. The complete
task descriptions (as provided to the participants) are available
on the companion website [16].
The most important part of the description of each task
depicts a security requirement that the participants have to
implement in the design of the banking system. The task also
includes context information, which provides the necessary
background and rationale for the security requirement. Fur-
thermore, additional constraints are included where necessary,
TABLE II
SHORT SUMMARY OF THE TASKS. TASKS ARE ASSOCIATED WITH THE
SECURITY PATTERNS THAT ARE EXPECTED TO BE USEFUL.
Task description
(A) (warm-up) Reduce the number of passwords that an employee has to
remember (single sign on).
B Protect sensitive information stored by the banking app on a mobile
device. Expected pattern: Encrypted storage
C Prevent read access to the transaction store from a publicly available
system. Expected patterns: Demilitarized zone, Firewall
D Make sure customers do not have to re-authenticate for every request.
Expected patterns: Session, Session Timeout, Session Failover
E An employee should be accountable for all actions performed on a
customer account. Expected patterns: Secure Logger, Audit Interceptor
F Ensure customers can only perform operations on their own accounts.
Expected patterns: Input Guard, Authorization Enforcer
G Protect the data that is transmitted between a mobile device and the
bank. Expected pattern: Secure Pipe
TABLE III
THE NUMBER OF TEAMS PER TREATMENT IS BALANCED ACROSS TASKS.
B C D E F G
Without patterns 14 16 17 16 18 15
With patterns 18 16 15 16 14 17
to guide the participants and scope their effort. For instance,
the context of task A is that the bank policy requires passwords
to be sufficiently complex. It could be cumbersome for the
employees to remember the different, complex passwords they
need to access the various bank services. Therefore, the secu-
rity requirement is about supporting single sign on for the bank
employees. However, an additional architectural constraint is
provided that interfaces towards third party services (e.g., an
external fraud detection company) cannot be modified.
Task A is a warmup task, which is always executed as first
and without using the security patterns. This task is used to
familiarize the participants with the various aspects of the
study, like the lab material, tools and procedures. No data
is collected during this task. The other six tasks (B–G) are
executed by the teams in a different, random order. The teams
execute the first three tasks (of their random sequence of six
tasks) using their own knowledge, and the last three tasks with
the support of the catalog of security patterns. That is, each
team is exposed to both treatments. The randomization has
been performed with the objective of achieving a balanced
amount of teams that execute each task with and without
patterns. The final distribution of teams is given in Table III.
The six tasks were defined in such a way that at least one
pattern from the catalog could be used to solve the task, as
described in Table II. The task are of very similar difficulty and
are expected to take about 45 minutes each to be completed.
At the end of the study, we asked the participants to rate their
perceived difficulty of tasks B–G. On average, the participants
rated the six tasks with the same difficulty level (i.e., as
‘average’, on a five-levels scale from ‘very easy’ to ‘very
difficult’).
Misuse case F.1
Short description A customer, when entering a money transfer via the
web banking interface, provides a valid source account ID of which he
is not a holder, thus allowing him to transfer money from some other
customer’s account.
Preconditions The customer is authenticated.
Attacker profile Rogue customer (via web interface)
Scenario
1) The customer enters a new transfer from one of his accounts in the
web banking application.
2) Before sending the transfer to the web server, the customer changes
the source account to a different, valid and existing account (e.g.
by tampering the parameters of the HTTP PUT request).
3) The transaction is accepted and issued for processing.
Fig. 1. Example of a misuse case for task F (summarized).
E. Misuse cases (MUC)
Every task (except the warm-up task) is associated with
5 threats describing design-level weaknesses, which are used
to test the quality of the design solutions proposed by the
participants for the corresponding task. These threats have
been defined before the execution of the study started. For
documentation purposes, the threats are represented as misuse
cases (MUC, [17]). An example of a misuse case is given
in Fig. 1. As shown, each misuse case comprises a short
description, a set of preconditions for the misuse case to be
possible, the attacker profile, the scenario, and optionally one
or more alternative scenarios. The misuse cases are chosen
in such a way that they cover a broad range of weaknesses,
and the overlap among them (per task) is minimal. Also, the
granularity of weaknesses exposed by the misuse case is kept
the same. Finally, the misuse cases associated to a task have
a similar importance in terms of security risk.
F. Collected measurements
Measuring security. The most important measure that we
collect is the number of covered misuse cases per task, which
ranges from 0 to 5.
After the teams have completed all tasks and have submitted
their solutions, they are provided with the misuse cases, which
the experimenters use to evaluate the designs. The teams have
to prepare a written report in which, per task, they discuss how
their submitted solution eliminates (some of) the misuse cases
or, alternatively, have to mark (some of) the misuse cases as
uncovered. It is made clear to the participants that, because
they are not security experts, their grade is not based on the
number of covered misuse cases, but rather on the quality of
their reasoning (i.e., why the misuse case is not covered, or
how it is prevented by their solution).
Three security experts (one not involved with the execution
of this study) independently assess the solutions. Each expert
evaluates the tasks performed by about one third of the teams.
The expert makes his own assessments, but takes into account
the provided reasoning of the team, for example to discover
undocumented but plausible assumptions made by the team.
In rare cases, a discussion during the exam is used to improve
the expert’s understanding of the solution.
A disadvantage of this approach is that only five specific
scenarios per task are considered. This is akin to unit-testing
for code: even with all test cases passed, flaws may still
exist. As a complementary device, and before analyzing the
misuse cases, the experts make an overall assessment of the
correctness of each task’s solution. The correctness score is an
ordinal variable, with 3 possible values: wrong (0), some errors
(1), and correct (2). While this scoring system cannot capture
fine details, and is clearly more subjective than counting the
misuse cases, it is useful to obtain an additional rough estimate
of the soundness of the solution. We expect that the correctness
score and the number of covered misuse cases correlate.
Measuring productivity. We also collect the time that each
team spends executing each task. This time is seamlessly
and reliably measured by the tool that the teams use (see
Section IV-D). The measure starts when a task is made
available to the team via the tool, and ends when the solution
for that task is submitted (again, via the tool). Hence, the
time includes the time needed to read and analyze the task
description, choose a solution, and integrate the solution into
the design that is given as a starting point.
Finally, if the task is executed using security patterns, we
collect the patterns that were selected to solve the task. This
information is also obtained from the tool and is used in the
discussion section of this paper.
G. Hypotheses
Given the above measurement procedure, we can translate
the two research questions stated in the introduction into the
following precise null hypotheses.
Security. We count how many misuse cases per task are
covered by a team’s solution, resulting in the security score s
that can take values from 0 to 5. This leads to the following
null-hypothesis that we want to disprove:
Hs
0
: The usage of security patterns has no influence on the
mean number of covered misuse cases for a task.
Productivity. We measure the time t it takes each of the
teams to complete a security design task. This leads to the
following null-hypothesis:
Ht
0
: The usage of security patterns has no influence on the
mean time needed to complete a task.
IV. STUDY EXECUTION
As mentioned earlier, our study is executed in the context
of a course on software architecture. This course consists of 3
parts. In the first part, the students perform a domain analysis
and elicit use cases for the banking system. In the second part,
which is the main part of the course, they design the software
architecture. Finally, in the third part, they revisit the design in
light of security requirements. This study is positioned in the
third part. As shown in Fig. 2, the study begins with a training
phase and proceeds with two (non-overlapping) phases.
A. Phase 0: Training
In the training phase, the teams attend two lectures of 2.5
hours each. The lectures introduce the participants to security
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Fig. 2. The study.
and provide information about the study. For instance, the
lectures cover generic security objectives like confidentiality,
integrity, availability and accountability (CIAA) and illustrate
common security attacks and weaknesses. Further, the lectures
describe the design approach to more secure software, in-
cluding secure design principles, design building blocks (e.g.,
encryption) and security strategies (e.g., preventing, reacting,
and monitoring). The slides used during the training phase are
available online [16]
Additionally, the lectures roughly explain the setup of the
current study, without disclosing the tested hypotheses or men-
tioning the concept of security patterns, which are introduced
in phase 2. Finally, the initial design of the banking system
(used for the tasks) is also presented, and a demonstration is
given of the tool the participants will work with. The initial
design is made available in PDF to the teams right after the
training is complete, and prior to the beginning of phase 1.
During the training, it is repeatedly pledged that the ob-
tained measurements are not looked at before the final grades
for the course are filed, in order to avoid influencing the
participants’ way of working during the execution of the study.
At the end of the lectures, the students are invited to fill out
an anonymous questionnaire on their background. The answers
to this questionnaire have been discussed earlier in this paper
(see Section III-A).
B. Phase 1: Without security patterns
In the first phase of the study, all teams work without
having access to (or knowledge of) the security patterns. The
participants use their own knowledge and the information
provided during the training. The teams work in a supervised
lab session, where they have access to a PC with the necessary
material. The teams begin with a warmup exercise in order
to get familiar with the procedure, the design of the banking
system, and the tool used during the study (as described in Sec-
tion IV-D). The exercise consists of performing the warmup
task A. Then, the teams evaluate their solution with respect to
3 misuse cases, so that they get a better understanding of how
their results are evaluated (see also Section III-F).
After the warmup exercise, the teams execute 3 tasks, which
are randomly selected from the 6 available tasks (B–G). The
description of a task is automatically provided by the tool once
the previous task has been completed and submitted. The tool
also provides the description of the initial design that has to
TABLE IV
QUESTIONNAIRE AT THE END OF PHASE 1 (SD=STRONGLY DISAGREE;
D=DISAGREE; A=AGREE; SA=STRONGLY AGREE).
You had a clear understanding of what the assignment asked you to do
SD: 4 D: 10 A: 18 SA: 0
The training and the warmup exercise were sufficient to become familiar
with the initial architecture
SD: 1 D: 6 A: 22 SA: 3
TThe training and the warmup exercise were sufficient to become
familiar with the tool
SD: 2 D: 2 A: 21 SA: 7
be extended according to the task description. For each of the
tasks, the teams restart from the initial design, i.e., whenever
a task is completed, the design is reverted to the starting point
before the next task is started, and their changes are not carried
over to the next task. This way of working, although slightly
unnatural, makes the tasks independent from one another. To
increase this independence even more, the teams also have to
submit their solution for each task before advancing to the
next, and they are not allowed to revisit earlier tasks. The
teams are also advised not to discuss the tasks with each other.
Note that the misuse cases for the performed tasks are not
disclosed at this stage.
At the end of phase 1, the teams fill out a questionnaire.
As shown in Table IV, the answers support our assumption
that the majority of the teams had a clear understanding of
the assignment, and felt sufficiently familiar with the initial
architectural design and the tool.
C. Phase 2: With security patterns
As shown in Fig. 2, at the start of the second phase,
the teams receive a lecture on security patterns (including a
brief summary of the patterns in the catalog) as well as a
demonstration of the additional functionality of the tool (i.e.,
how to browse and select security patterns).
At the beginning of the supervised lab session, the teams
perform a warmup exercise consisting in answering a question
(i.e., “Which patterns from the catalog are appropriate for
authentication, and why?”). In order to answer, they need to
familiarize themselves with the pattern catalog and the new
functionality of the tool. Afterwards, the teams perform the
remaining three tasks (of their random sequence) and are
requested to use security patterns to solve the tasks. Like
in the previous phase, the solution for a task needs to be
submitted before advancing to the next task, and going back
is not allowed.
Once more, a questionnaire is administered at the end of this
phase, and the answers in Table V support our assumption
that the assignment was clear, and that the participants feel
sufficiently familiar with the patterns.
D. Tool support
As mentioned, the execution of the study is heavily sup-
ported by a tool we built for the purpose [16]. This tool is
TABLE V
QUESTIONNAIRE AT THE END OF PHASE 2 (SD=STRONGLY DISAGREE;
D=DISAGREE; A=AGREE; SA=STRONGLY AGREE).
You had a clear understanding of what the assignment asked you to do
SD: 0 D: 3 A: 24 SA: 5
The training and the warmup exercise were sufficient to become familiar
with the concept of security patterns
SD: 0 D: 5 A: 26 SA: 1
The training and the warmup exercise were sufficient to become familiar
with the catalog of security patterns
SD: 1 D: 3 A: 28 SA: 0
an Eclipse environment (version 4.2.2) including the Papyrus
UML editor (version 0.10M6). A custom extension provides
a wizard to guide the team through the study. Also, a browser
for the security pattern catalog is embedded into the tool.
When a team starts the tool for the first time, they have to
enter their team code. Based on this code, the task order for
that team is loaded from a configuration file. The tool enforces
the sequential execution of the phases of the study, and unlocks
the security pattern catalog at the start of phase 2. Furthermore,
within each phase, the tool enforces the strict order of the
tasks, and makes it impossible to return to an earlier task. At
the start of each task, it takes care of preparing a new copy
of the original architectural design.
For each task, the tool measures how much time a team
spends solving it. Note that the tool interrupts the time
measurement when the tool loses focus or is closed, i.e.,
it omits periods of inactivity. For the tasks supported by
security patterns, the tool additionally records which patterns
are browsed (and for how long), and which are eventually
selected. The tool takes care of submitting the solutions and
the collected measurements to an online server at the end of
each task. Throughout the study, the various questionnaires
are also filled out in the tool, and submitted together with the
measurements.
Finally, all configuration files and resources (e.g., the task
descriptions and the pattern catalog) related to the study are
encrypted to prevent participants from viewing this material
outside of the tool, or at a wrong point in time. The collected
measurements are encrypted as well.
V. RESULTS
In this section, the collected data is analyzed to statistically
test the two hypotheses stated in Section III-G. Additional
findings that are interesting but not directly related to either
hypothesis can be found in Section VI. As a reminder, task A
only served as a warm-up task, so all data related to this task
is ignored in the rest of this paper.
For the entire study, we set the significance level α = 0.05.
When reporting p-values, we use ∗ to indicate p < 0.05,
and ∗∗ for p < 0.01. All statistical tests are performed using R
[18].
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Fig. 3. Distribution of the number of covered misuse cases per task. The
table at the bottom reports the average and standard deviation, as well as the
p-values of the Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon test.
A. Effect on security
Figure 3 shows the number of covered misuse cases per task,
together with the mean per task. The mean number of covered
misuse cases is consistently higher when security patterns are
used, albeit not by much. We perform a two-sided Mann–
Whitney–Wilcoxon (wilcox.test in R) test to determine
whether there is indeed enough evidence to reject the null
hypothesis Hs
0
. The resulting p-values of the test are reported
in the last row of Fig. 3. For none of the tasks can a statistically
significant effect be appreciated, and hence, we cannot reject
the null hypothesis.
As shown in Fig. 4, we have also compared the coverage
of the individual misuse cases across the teams with and
without security patterns. A two-sided test for equal propor-
tions (prop.test in R) also does not detect any statistically
significant difference between the two groups for any of the
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Fig. 5. Distribution of the correctness scores for each task. The darker-filled
bars indicate the median correctness score. The table below the graph reports
the p-values of the Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon test.
misuse cases.
Next to the number of misuse cases, we can also consider
the overall correctness scores, whose distribution is given in
Fig. 5. To statistically verify whether using security patterns
affect the correctness score, we again perform a two-sided
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Fig. 6. Box plot aggregating all tasks and depicting the correctness score of
a team’s solution (x-axis) and the corresponding number of covered misuse
cases (y-axis).
Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon test. The p-values of this test (see
the bottom of Fig. 5) indicate that there is a statistically
significant effect for tasks C and E.
We also remark that (as expected) the correctness score and
the number of covered misuse cases are positively correlated,
as can be seen from Fig. 6. This is confirmed by Kendall’s τ =
0.504 (p < 2 · 10−16 **), where τ = 0 means no association
and τ = ±1 means perfect association). This supports our
assumption that both measures indeed reflect (roughly) the
same phenomenon.
In summary, the null hypothesis Hs
0
cannot be rejected, and
we conclude that the usage of security patterns cannot be
shown to affect the security of the design, when the security
of the design is measured as the number of covered misuse
cases. However, in a few cases, the usage of security patterns
might improve the correctness of the design as a whole.
B. Effect on productivity
In some cases, individual measurements for the task exe-
cution time were suspiciously long, like a reported time of
more than 4 hours for a single task (sometimes even up
to multiple days). These measurements (six in total) were
manually inspected and found to be erroneous due to a bug in
the tool. At times, when the team left the tool running in the
background without using it, the tool did not correctly register
that it became inactive. Hence, these measurements were
considered as outliers and consequently removed. Incidentally,
we believe that this bug was only triggered in some specific
instances, and did not affect the rest of the teams.
Figure 7 summarizes the time measurements for each task
in a density plot. In the figure, the average execution times per
task are marked by the vertical lines. In all tasks, the average
time is larger when the security patterns are used (dotted blue
lines). However, the difference is very small. We have also
observed a quite large variance in all tasks.
To statistically assess the effect of using patterns on the
execution time (and, hence, the productivity), we first test
whether the data is normally distributed with the Shapiro-
Wilk test. It turns out that this is not the case, so we perform
a non-parametric test. In particular, a two-sample, two-sided
Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon test is used to detect the presence
of a location shift (i.e., difference in median) between the time
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Fig. 7. Density plot of the time t spent per task (B–G). The vertical lines
indicate the sample means. The p-values mentioned on each plot are obtained
from the Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon test. Sample mean and standard variation
are also reported in the table at the bottom of the figure.
distributions of the two groups. The test results (Fig. 7) show
that no p-value lies below our significance level, so we have
not observed a significant difference in the execution time.
We have also performed a more general Kolmogorov–Smirnov
test, which confirms the previous findings. Hence, the null
hypothesis Ht
0
cannot be rejected, and we conclude that the
usage of security patterns cannot be shown to affect the
productivity.
VI. DISCUSSION
In this section, we take a deeper look into the solution
strategies that were used to solve the tasks, and discuss the
perception of the participants with respect to security patterns.
A. Solution strategies
An interesting question is whether the teams ended up
using the same (or at least similar) solutions for each security
requirement, irrespective of the treatment. To enable this
analysis, we need to group similar solutions. For the cases
where the teams have not used patterns, we have manually
classified the solution strategies that were used into a limited
number of categories. This ‘taxonomy’ of strategies has been
developed in a bottom up, iterative way. The top rows of
Figs. 8 and 9 show the percentages of each approach. It is
clear that, for most tasks, there is a dominant strategy that
most teams pick (this is less obvious for task B).
For the cases where the teams have used patterns, we mea-
sure the popularity of each security pattern as the percentage
of teams that have chosen that pattern as (part of) their solution
for a particular task. It is not uncommon that teams select a
group of patterns (mostly two) to solve a requirement. The
mean number of selected patterns per task are 1.6 (B), 2.2
(C), 2.1 (D), 1.8 (E), 2.6 (F), and 1.2 (G). As before, it is
clear from the bottom rows of Figs. 8 and 9 that most teams
align in choosing the same pattern or set of patterns. Also,
the most popular patterns correspond to the patterns that were
mentioned as expected in Table II.
A comparison of the most popular solutions between the
treatment groups shows a clear correspondence between the
two approaches. That is, when not using the patterns, the
teams select solutions that resemble the ones suggested in the
catalog. We remind that the treatment diffusion problem plays
no role here, as the teams first use their own knowledge in
phase 1 and then the patterns in a subsequent phase 2. Hence,
they cannot imitate the solutions in the catalog of patterns.
The correspondence of the solutions thus suggests that the
solutions provided by the security patterns are already quite
common among software developers, i.e., they are intuitively
selected even by designers without expertise in security.
A remarkable exception occurs for task C, however. The
intended solution for this task involves introducing a demilita-
rized zone (DMZ) using firewalls. The corresponding pattern
was picked by most teams that had access to the pattern
catalog, while the solutions from the teams without access
to the patterns were focused more on authentication and au-
thorization. Nevertheless, the DMZ pattern was often applied
incorrectly, as can be seen from the rather low coverage of
misuse cases for task C in Fig. 3. A possible explanation
could be that a DMZ is not very well-known among the
participants, which leads to either not thinking about using
it (for the teams not using patterns), or using it incorrectly
(for the teams using patterns). From Fig. 5, it can be seen that
the correctness score in task C for the group with patterns
is indeed centered around ‘some errors’, while the score for
the other group is predominantly ‘wrong’. This difference is
statistically significant (Fig. 5).
In both treatment groups, a frequent problem with the
solutions of the participants is a lack of certain details in
the description of the solution. For instance, for solutions
involving encryption, an aspect that was often overlooked
was the key management (e.g., providing support for key
setup and distribution, changing the key, or revoking a key).
This was the case even when a pattern such as Encrypted
Storage was used, which explicitly mentions the importance
of considering key management issues [19]. The danger of
omitting these details in the design is that they will then
need to be specified during the actual development, possibly
introducing errors or weaknesses. Possibly, the notation used
in the study (UML) does not easily support the designer in
expressing these concerns.
B. Perception
The questionnaire administered at end of phase 2 also
included some questions to gauge the teams’ perception about
the usage of security patterns (Table VI).
Task B
OS Security
Encrypt
0 25 50 75 100
Popularity (%)
Task C
Input validation
Firewall
DMZ
Encryption
AuthZ/AuthN
0 25 50 75 100
Popularity (%)
Task D
Replication
Encryption
Session/Tokens
0 25 50 75 100
Popularity (%)
Task B
Audit Interceptor
Container Managed Security
Obfuscated Transfer Object
Secure Service Facade
Secure Session Object
Secure Pipe
Authentication Enforcer
Encrypted Storage
25 50 75100
Popularity (%)
Task C
Authentication Enforcer
Limited View
Reverse Proxy
Secure Pipe
Secure Service Facade
Application Firewall
Input Guard
Server Sandbox
Firewall
Demilitarized Zone
20 40 60 80
Popularity (%)
Task D
Obfuscated Transfer Object
Security Context
Credential Tokenizer
Encrypted Storage
Secure Pipe
Session Failover
Session Timeout
Secure Session Object
Session
20 40 60
Popularity (%)
Fig. 8. Popularity of the solutions (manual solution strategies in the top row and security patterns in the bottom row), as the percentage of the teams that
have implemented it, for tasks B, C, and D. Note that the teams often select more than one solution per task.
TABLE VI
PERCEPTION ABOUT SECURITY PATTERNS. ABBREVIATIONS: STRONGLY
DISAGREE (SD), DISAGREE (D), AGREE (A), STRONGLY AGREE (SA).
Which technique did you like more?
No patterns: Patterns: No preference:
4 23 5
How hard was it to find the appropriate pattern in the catalog?
Very easy: Easy: Average: Difficult: Very difficult:
0 13 16 3 0
Are the patterns in the catalog clearly described?
SD: 0 D: 11 A: 17 SA: 4
Does the catalog contain solutions you would have not
imagined yourself (i.e., are the patterns inspiring)?
SD: 1 D: 10 A: 20 SA: 1
When asked about their preference after having worked both
with and without security patterns, a large majority (23 teams)
stated that they prefer to work with the support of security
patterns. Interestingly, all 7 teams with a member from the
academic specialization in security preferred using patterns.
A possible explanation for this preference is that the pres-
ence of some guidance when solving the tasks increases the
psychological confidence of the teams in their solution. The
teams found the catalog easy to use: only 3 teams said
the patterns were difficult to find, which is supported by
our observation that most participants have indeed been able
to select the intended pattern from the catalog. Moreover,
according to the participants, the patterns in the catalog were
clearly described. This observation agrees with our earlier
study [6], which used the same pattern catalog.
Finally, a majority (21 teams) indicated that the patterns
were inspiring, that is, the patterns provide solutions that
the participants would not come up with themselves. This
appears to contradict our observations, as we concluded that,
in practice, the solutions created without access to the security
patterns are often very similar to the pattern-based solutions.
VII. THREATS TO VALIDITY
Internal validity. Our study relies on randomization and the
use of warmup tasks to mitigate the most important threats to
internal validity. Nevertheless, some threats remain.
The misuse cases are written in a generic form, so that
they apply to the solution of as many teams as possible.
Nevertheless, they may not cover all vulnerabilities introduced
by a solution, and thus counting the number of covered misuse
cases is only an approximation for the ‘true’ security of the
software design (insofar as this can be quantified at all).
Furthermore, Table IV shows that only a slight majority of
the teams clearly understood the assignment in phase 1. This
is not the case for phase 2 (Table V). The lower understanding
may just be due to a lack of experience at the beginning of
the study, or it may reflect a desire for more support, such as
that provided by patterns.
For the time measurements, we have attempted to obtain
accurate numbers by using the tool. It remains possible,
however, that the tool was running in the foreground while no
work was performed, leading to incorrect measurements. The
measured time is thus only an upper bound on the actual time,
but, from experience, our measurements are still more accurate
than, e.g., relying on time sheets filled in by the participants.
External validity. There are a few threats when general-
izing our results to software designers performing security-
Task E
Authorization
Digital Signatures
Anomaly Detection
Encryption
Audit Log
0 25 50 75 100
Popularity (%)
Task F
Logging
Encryption
Tokens
Input Validation
AuthZ/AuthN
0 25 50 75 100
Popularity (%)
Task G
Verify Request Source
Two−Factor Authentication
Intrusion Detection
No Storage
Encryption
0 25 50 75 100
Popularity (%)
Task E
Authentication Enforcer
Authorization Enforcer
Encrypted Storage
Limited View
Secure Pipe
Secure Service Facade
Security Context
Single Access Point
Audit Interceptor
Secure Logger
25 50 75
Popularity (%)
Task F
Obfuscated Transfer Object
Output Guard
Secure Session Object
Server Sandbox
Session
Single Access Point
Application Firewall
Audit Interceptor
Encrypted Storage
Secure Service Facade
Limited View
Authorization Enforcer
Input Guard
20 40 60
Popularity (%)
Task G
Application Firewall
Audit Interceptor
Secure Access Layer
Secure Service Facade
Security Association
Secure Pipe
25 50 75
Popularity (%)
Fig. 9. Same information as Fig. 8, but for tasks E, F, and G.
related tasks using patterns. First, the participants of our study
are master students and not experienced software designers.
Nevertheless, they can be considered the novices for whom
security patterns are supposed to deliver the most value.
Furthermore, a majority of the participants already has some
professional experience. Hence, we believe that our findings
can still be generalized to (beginning) professional designers.
The tasks for this study have been defined with certain se-
curity patterns in mind. While the misuse cases have not been
based on these patterns, using an existing system for which
the security requirements and misuse cases have already been
defined would make the study more realistic. Unfortunately,
the authors have been unable to find such documentation
readily available in the literature.
A different threat originates from the use of an artificial tool
environment. According to the participants, the used tool was
not user-friendly. The main problems that were reported are
bugs and performance issues of the UML editor. Also, some
teams were complaining that the catalog is only available via
the tool, and not on paper or online. While this is indeed an
artificial situation, this was a deliberate choice in the design
of the study, to make the collected data more accurate.
Further, our results reflect the case where an initial design is
extended with security. Different results may be obtained for
greenfield projects. However, in our experience, the approach
of hardening an existing design is a rather common practice
in the industrial context. Also, we have only worked with a
single application, so further studies are required to confidently
generalize our findings to other application domains.
Finally, our results depend on the specific selection of
security patterns that are made available to the participants.
The patterns in the catalog have been selected because they are
well documented. Also, the catalog has been used successfully
in earlier editions of the course. Hence, we are confident that
the included patterns are representative of the state of the art.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this study, we have set out to verify whether security
patterns actually provide their touted benefits to the software
designers that use them. Contrary to our expectations, we have
not been able to conclusively demonstrate that the their usage
improves the security of the design, nor that they influence the
productivity of the software designer.
Despite these results, we remain convinced that the solutions
that are proposed by the patterns are useful for software
designers. It is not so clear, however, whether representing
those solutions as security patterns provides sufficient added
value. It appears that the strategies and solutions described by
the security patterns are intuitive, also for non-expert secure
software designers. Therefore, security patterns have a reduced
value in pointing the designers in the right direction.
Security patterns might have an instrumental role in sup-
porting the designers when it comes to the details of the
‘implementation’ of such strategies and solutions in a concrete
design. However, this effect has not been observed either,
possibly due to a sub-optimal quality of the documentation
of existing security patterns, as pointed out by previous work
[20]. Nevertheless, the conclusions of this study might be an
incentive for the secure software engineering community to
improve the state of the art in the area of security patterns.
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